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Abstract
Distributed learning has become a hot research topic, due to its wide application in
cluster-based large-scale learning, federated learning, edge computing and so on. Most
distributed learning methods assume no error and attack on the workers. However, many
unexpected cases, such as communication error and even malicious attack, may happen
in real applications. Hence, Byzantine learning (BL), which refers to distributed learning
with attack or error, has recently attracted much attention. Most existing BL methods
are synchronous, which will result in slow convergence when there exist heterogeneous
workers. Furthermore, in some applications like federated learning and edge computing,
synchronization cannot even be performed most of the time due to the offline workers (clients
or edge servers). Hence, asynchronous BL (ABL) is more general and practical than
synchronous BL (SBL). To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two ABL methods.
One of them cannot resist malicious attack. The other needs to store some training instances
on the server, which has the privacy leak problem. In this paper, we propose a novel method,
called buffered asynchronous stochastic gradient descent (BASGD), for BL. BASGD is an
asynchronous method. Furthermore, BASGD has no need to store any training instances
on the server, and hence can preserve privacy in ABL. BASGD is theoretically proved to
have the ability of resisting against error and malicous attack. Moreover, BASGD has a
similar theoretical convergence rate to that of vanilla asynchronous SGD (ASGD), with an
extra constant variance. Empirical results show that BASGD can significantly outperform
vanilla ASGD and other ABL baselines, when there exists error or attack on workers.
1. Introduction
Due to the wide application in cluster-based large-scale learning, federated learning (Konevcny`
et al., 2016; Kairouz et al., 2019), edge computing (Shi et al., 2016) and so on, distributed
learning has recently become a hot research topic (Zinkevich et al., 2010; Yang, 2013; Jaggi
et al., 2014; Shamir et al., 2014; Zhang and Kwok, 2014; Ma et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2017;
Lian et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2018; Wangni et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2018;
Zhou et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019a,b). Most existing distributed learning methods are based
on stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and its variants (Bottou, 2010; Xiao, 2010; Duchi
et al., 2011; Johnson and Zhang, 2013; Shalev-Shwartz and Zhang, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013;
Lin et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019b). Furthermore,
most existing distributed learning methods assume no error and attack on the workers.
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However, in real distributed learning applications with multiple networked machines (nodes),
different kinds of hardware or software errors may happen. Representative errors include
bit-flipping in the communication media and the memory of some workers (Xie et al., 2019b).
In this case, a small error on some machines (workers) might cause a distributed learning
method to fail. In addition, malicious attack should not be neglected in an open network
where the manager (or server) generally has not much control on the workers, such as
the cases of edge computing and federated learning. Some malicious workers may behave
arbitrarily or even adversarially. Hence, Byzantine learning (BL), which refers to distributed
learning with attack or error, has recently attracted much attention (Blanchard et al., 2017;
Alistarh et al., 2018; Damaskinos et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019b).
Existing BL methods can be divided into two main categories: synchronous BL (SBL)
methods and asynchronous BL (ABL) methods. In SBL methods, the learning information,
such as the gradient in SGD, of all workers will be aggregated in a synchronous way. On
the contrary, in ABL methods the learning information of workers will be aggregated in an
asynchronous way. Existing SBL methods mainly take two different ways to achieve resilience
against Byzantine workers which refer to those workers with attack or error. One way is
to replace the simple averaging aggregation operation with some more robust aggregation
operations, such as median, trimmed-mean (Yin et al., 2018) and Krum (Blanchard et al.,
2017). The other way is to filter the suspicious learning information (gradients) before
averaging. Representative examples include ByzantineSGD (Alistarh et al., 2018) and
Zeno (Xie et al., 2019b). The advantage of SBL methods is that they are relatively simple
and easy to be implemented. But SBL methods will result in slow convergence when there
exist heterogeneous workers. Furthermore, in some applications like federated learning and
edge computing, synchronization cannot even be performed most of the time due to the
offline workers (clients or edge servers). Hence, ABL is more general and practical than SBL.
To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two ABL methods: Kardam (Damaskinos
et al., 2018) and Zeno++ (Xie et al., 2019a). Kardam introduces two filters to drop out
suspicious learning information (gradients), which can still achieve good performance when
the communication delay is heavy. However, when in face of malicious attack, some work (Xie
et al., 2019a) finds that Kardam also drops out most correct gradients in order to filter all
faulty (error) gradients. Hence, Kardam cannot resist malicious attack. Zeno++ scores each
received gradient, and determines whether to accept it according to the score. But Zeno++
needs to store some training instances on the server for scoring. In practical applications,
storing data on the server will increase the risk of privacy leak or even face legal risk.
Therefore, under the general setting where the server has no access to any training instances,
there have not existed ABL methods to resist malicious attack.
In this paper, we propose a novel method, called buffered asynchronous stochastic
gradient descent (BASGD), for BL. The main contributions of BASGD are listed as follows:
• BASGD is an asynchronous method, and hence BASGD is more general and practical
than existing SBL methods.
• BASGD has no need to store any training instances on the server, and hence can
preserve privacy in ABL.
• BASGD is theoretically proved to have the ability of resisting against error and
malicious attack.
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Figure 1: Parameter Server framework
• BASGD has a similar theoretical convergence rate to that of vanilla asynchronous
SGD (ASGD), with an extra constant variance.
• Empirical results show that BASGD can significantly outperform vanilla ASGD and
other ABL baselines when there exist error or malicious attack on workers. In particular,
BASGD can still converge under cases with malicious attack in which ASGD and other
ABL methods fail.
2. Preliminary
This section presents the preliminary of this paper, including the distributed learning
framework used in this paper and the definition of Byzantine worker.
2.1 Distributed Learning Framework
Many machine learning models, such as logistic regression and deep neural networks, can be
formulated as the following finite sum optimization problem:
min
w∈Rd
F (w) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(w; zi), (1)
where w is the parameter to learn, d is the dimension of parameter, n is the number of
training instances, f(w; zi) is the empirical loss on the training instance zi. The goal of this
work is to solve the optimization problem in (1), by designing distributed learning algorithms
on multiple networked machines.
Although there have appeared many distributed learning frameworks, in this paper we
focus on the widely used Parameter Server (PS) framework (Li et al., 2014) which is shown
in Figure 1. In a PS framework, there are several workers and one server or multiple servers.
Each worker can only communicate with the server(s). There may exist more than one server
in a PS framework, but for the problem of this paper the servers can be logically conceived
as a unity. Without loss of generality, we will assume there is only one server in this paper.
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Algorithm 1 Asynchronous SGD (ASGD)
Server:
Initialization: initial parameter w0, learning rate η;
Send initial w0 to all workers;
for t = 0 to tmax − 1 do
Wait until gtkt is received from some worker kt;
Execute SGD step: wt+1 ← wt − η · gtkt ;
Send wt+1 back to worker kt;
end for
Notify all workers to stop;
Worker k: (k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1)
repeat
Wait until receiving the latest parameter w from server;
Randomly sample an index i from Dk;
Compute ∇f(w; zi);
Send ∇f(w; zi) to server;
until receive server’s notification to stop
Training instances are disjointedly distributed across m workers. Let Dk denote the index
set of training instances on worker k, we have ∪mk=1Dk = {1, 2, . . . , n} and Dk ∩ Dk′ = ∅ if
k 6= k′. In this paper, we assume that the server has no access to any training instances.
One popular asynchronous method to solve the problem in (1) under the PS framework
is ASGD which is presented in Algorithm 1. Here, each worker sample one instance for
gradient computation each time. Each worker can also sample a mini-batch of instances for
gradient computation each time. The effect of batch size is not the focus of this work, and
the analysis of this paper can also be easily adapted for cases with mini-batch. Hence, in
this paper we do not separately discuss the mini-batch case.
In PS based ASGD, the server is responsible for updating and maintaining the latest
parameter. We use the number of iterations that the server has already executed as the
current iteration number of the server. At the very beginning, the iteration number t = 0.
Each time a SGD step is executed, t will be increased by 1 immediately. Iteration number
can also be seen as the version of parameter, and we denote the parameter after t iterations
as wt.
The server may have executed several SGD steps between the time when worker k
receives parameter wt1 and the time when worker k sends back the gradient computed based
on wt1 . We use t2 to denote the iteration number on the server when receiving the gradient
computed based on wt1 . Delay τ is defined as τ = t2 − t1.
2.2 Byzantine Worker
Between two iterations on the server, a worker may send nothing, send gradient only once, or
send gradient more than once. Though the last case is impossible in ASGD (see Algorithm 1),
but it may happen in BASGD (refer to Section 3).
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For workers that have sent gradients to server at iteration t, we call some worker a loyal
worker if the worker has finished all the tasks without any fault and each sent gradient is
correctly received by the server with delay τ ≤ τmax, where τmax is a constant. Otherwise,
worker k is called a Byzantine worker. If worker k is a Byzantine worker, it means the
received gradient from worker k is not credible, which may be an arbitrary value.
We use Gt to denote the index set of workers that the server has received gradient from
at iteration t, namely, between the t-th SGD step and the (t+ 1)-th SGD step. ∀k ∈ Gt, we
denote the gradient received from worker k at iteration t as gtk.
Please note that a worker may not be always loyal or always Byzantine. For example,
a loyal worker at iteration t1 may suffer from a bit-flipping at iteration t2, so it will be
identified as a Byzantine worker at iteration t2. Also, a malicious worker may sometimes
behave as loyal ones to hide itself, and will be seen as loyal at these normally working
iterations.
Furthermore, we define the index set of loyal workers at iteration t as follows:
Lt = {k ∈ Gt | ∃t′ ∈ [t− τmax, t], gtk = ∇f(wt
′
; zi), i is uniformly sampled from Dk}.
Thus, worker k is Byzantine at iteration t if k ∈ Gt \ Lt. Then, we have:
gtk =
{
∇f(wt′ ; zi), if k ∈ Lt;
arbitrary value, if k ∈ Gt \ Lt,
where 0 ≤ t− t′ ≤ τmax, and i is randomly sampled from Dk.
Our definition of Byzantine worker and loyal worker is consistent with most previous
works (Blanchard et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2019b) under the setting of synchronous Byzantine
learning which actually corresponds to the case τmax = 0. But our definition is more general
since it includes the cases with time delays, i.e., τmax ≥ 0, which cannot be neglected in an
asynchronous method. In particular, there are mainly two types of Byzantine workers in
ABL:
• Workers with malicious attack : This type of workers are controlled or hacked by
an adversarial party. They may send wrong or malicious gradients to the server on
purpose, and try to make learning method fail. This type of workers can be appeared in
some applications with open networks, such as edge computing and federated learning,
where the manager (or server) generally has not much control on the workers.
• Workers with accidental error : Although not necessarily malicious, this type of workers
may go wrong during the learning process, due to accidental errors such as bit flipping
and network failure. For cases with this type of workers, the gradient received by
the server might be too stale or wrongly transmitted. Although unintentionally, the
stale or faulty (error) gradients will slow down the convergence or even cause learning
methods to fail.
3. Buffered Asynchronous SGD
In synchronous BL, all gradients are received at the same time for updating parameters.
During this process, we can compare the gradients with each other, and then filter suspicious
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ones, or use more robust aggregation rules such as median and trimmed-mean for updating.
However, in asynchronous BL, only one gradient is received by the server at a time. Without
any training instances stored on the server, it is difficult for the server to identify whether a
received gradient is credible or not.
In order to deal with this problem in asynchronous BL, we propose a novel ABL method
called buffered asynchronous SGD (BASGD). BASGD introduces B buffers (0 < B ≤ m) on
the server, and the gradient used for updating parameters will be aggregated from these
buffers. The learning procedure of BASGD is presented in Algorithm 2. We can find that
BASGD degenerates to vanilla ASGD when buffer number B = 1.
In the following content of this section, we will introduce the details of the two key
components of BASGD: buffer and aggregation function.
3.1 Buffer
In BASGD, the workers do the same job as that in ASGD, while the updating rule on server
is modified. More specifically, there are B buffers (0 < B ≤ m) on the server. When the
server receives a gradient g from worker s, the parameter will not be updated immediately.
The gradient will be stored in a buffer b temporarily, where b = s mod B. A concrete
example is illustrated in Figure 2. Only when all buffers have got changed since the last
SGD step, a new SGD step will be executed.
For each buffer b, more than one gradient may have been received between two iterations.
We will store the average of these gradients, denoted by hb, in buffer b. Assume that there
are already (Nb − 1) gradients g1,g2, . . . ,gNb−1 which should be stored in buffer b, and
hb(old) =
1
Nb − 1
Nb−1∑
i=1
gi.
When the Nb-th gradient gNb is received, the new average value in buffer b should be:
hb(new) =
1
Nb
Nb∑
i=1
gi =
Nb − 1
Nb
· hb(old) +
1
Nb
· gNb .
This is the updating rule for each buffer b when a gradient is received. After the parameter
w is updated, all buffers will be zeroed out at once.
With the benefit of buffers, the server has access to B candidate gradients when updating
parameter. Thus, a more reliable (robust) gradient can be aggregated from the B gradients
of buffers, if a proper aggregation function Aggr(·) is chosen.
3.2 Aggregation Function
When a SGD step is ready to be executed, there are B buffers providing candidate gradients.
An aggregation function is needed to get the final gradient for updating. A simple function
is to take the mean of all candidate gradients. However, mean value is sensitive to outliers
which are common in BL.
For designing proper aggregation functions, we first define the q-Byzantine Robust (q-
BR) condition to quantitatively describe the Byzantine resilience ability of an aggregation
function.
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Algorithm 2 Buffered Asynchronous SGD (BASGD)
Server:
Input: learning rate η, buffer number B,
aggregation function: Aggr(·);
Initialization: initial parameter w0, learning rate η;
Send initial w0 to all workers;
Set t← 0;
Set buffer: hb ← 0, Nb ← 0;
repeat
Wait until receiving g from some worker s;
Choose buffer: b← s mod B;
Nb ← Nb + 1;
hb ← (Nb−1)hb+gNb ;
if Nb > 0 for each b ∈ [B] then
Aggregate: Gt = Aggr([h1, . . . ,hB]);
Execute SGD step: wt+1 ← wt − η ·Gt;
for b = 1 to B do
Zero out buffer: hb ← 0, Nb ← 0;
end for
t← t+ 1;
end if
Send wt back to worker s;
until stop criterion is satisfied
Notify all workers to stop;
Worker k: (k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1)
repeat
Wait until receiving the latest parameter w from server;
Randomly sample an index i from Dk;
Compute ∇f(w; zi);
Send ∇f(w; zi) to server;
until receive server’s notification to stop
Definition 1 (q-Byzantine Robust). For an aggregation function Aggr(·): Aggr([h1, . . . ,hB ]) =
G, where G = [G1, . . . , Gd]
T and hb = [hb1, . . . , hbd]
T ,∀b ∈ [B], we call Aggr(·) q-Byzantine
Robust (q ∈ Z, 0 < q < B/2), if it satisfies the following two properties:
a).∀h1, . . . ,hB ∈ Rd,∀h′ ∈ Rd,
Aggr([h1 + h
′, . . . ,hB + h′]) = Aggr([h1, . . . ,hB]) + h′;
b).∀j ∈ [d], ∀S ⊂ [B] with |S| = B − q,
min
s∈S
{hsj} ≤ Gj ≤ max
s∈S
{hsj}.
Intuitively, property a) in Definition 1 says that if all candidate gradients hi are added
by a same vector h′, the aggregated gradient will also be added by h′. Property b) says that
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Figure 2: An example of buffers. A circle represents a worker, and the number in a circle is
the worker ID. In this example, there are 15 workers and 5 buffers. The gradient
received from worker s is stored in a determinate buffer according to the worker
ID s. For example, the gradient received from worker 0, worker 5 and worker 10
will be stored in buffer 0.
for each coordinate j, the aggregated value Gj will be between the (q + 1)-th smallest value
and the (q + 1)-th largest value among the j-th coordinates of all candidate gradients. Thus,
the gradient aggregated by a q-BR function is insensitive to at least q outliers.
We can find that q-BR condition gets stronger when q increases. In other words, if
Aggr(·) is q-BR, then for any 0 < q′ < q, Aggr(·) is also q′-BR.
Remark 1. It is not hard to find that when B > 1, mean function is not q-Byzantine Robust
for any q > 0. We will illustrate this by a simple one-dimension example: h1, . . . , hB−1 ∈
[0, 1] ⊂ R, while hB = 10 × B. Then 1B
∑B
b=1 hb ≥ hBB = 10 6∈ [0, 1]. Namely, the mean is
larger than any of the first B − 1 values.
We find that the following two aggregation functions satisfy Byzantine Robust condition.
Definition 2 (Coordinate-wise median (Yin et al., 2018)). For B candidate gradients
h1,h2, . . . ,hB ∈ Rd, hb = [hb1, hb2, . . . , hbd]T , ∀b = 1, 2, . . . , B. Coordinate-wise median is
defined as:
Med([h1, . . . ,hB]) = [Med(h·1), . . . ,Med(h·d)]T ,
where Med(h·j) is the scalar median of the j-th coordinates of all candidate gradients,
∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d.
Definition 3 (Coordinate-wise q-trimmed-mean (Yin et al., 2018)). For any positive interger
q < B/2 and candidate gradients h1,h2, . . . ,hB ∈ Rd, hb = [hb1, hb2, . . . , hbd]T , ∀b =
1, 2, . . . , B. Coordinate-wise q-trimmed-mean is defined as:
Trm([h1, . . . ,hB]) = [Trm(h·1), . . . , T rm(h·d)]T ,
where Trm(h·j) is the scalar q-trimmed-mean:
Trm(h·j) =
1
B − 2q
∑
b∈Mj
hbj .
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Mj is the subset of {hbj}Bb=1 obtained by removing the q largest elements and q smallest
elements, ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , d.
In the following content, coordinate-wise median and coordinate-wise q-trimmed-mean
are also called median and trmean, respectively. Proposition 1 shows the q-BR property of
these two functions.
Proposition 1. With B candidate gradients, coordinate-wise q-trimmed-mean is q-BR, and
coordinate-wise median is bB−12 c-BR.
Here, bxc represents the maximum integer not larger than x. According to Proposition 1,
either median or trmean is a proper choice for aggregation function in BASGD.
3.3 Complexity
The time complexity for computing the average value of all buffers in each iteration is
O(Bd). If trmean or median is chosen as Aggr(·), the time complexity for each iteration
is O(Bd(B − 2q)) and O(Bd) for trmean and median, respectively. Hence, the total time
complexity is O(TBd(B − 2q)) and O(TBd) for trmean and median respectively, where T is
the total number of iterations. For space complexity, B buffers are introduced in BASGD.
Hence, the extra space complexity of BASGD is O(Bd).
4. Convergence
In this section, we theoretically prove the convergence and resilience of BASGD against
attack or error. Here we only present the main Lemmas and Theorems.
We make the following assumptions, which also have been widely used in stochastic
optimization methods like SGD-based methods. Please note that we do not give any
assumption about the behavior of Byzantine workers, which may behave arbitrarily.
Assumption 1 (Lower bound). Global loss function F (w) is bounded below: ∃F ∗ ∈
R, F (w) ≥ F ∗, ∀w ∈ Rd.
Assumption 2 (Unbiased estimation). For any loyal worker, it can use locally stored
training instances to obtain an estimated gradient of the global loss function with no bias:
E[∇f(w; zi)] = ∇F (w), ∀w ∈ Rd.
Assumption 3 (Limited second order moment). The gradient received from any loyal
worker has limited second order moment: E[||∇f(w; zi)||2|w] ≤ D2,∀w ∈ Rd.
Assumption 4 (L-smoothness). Global loss function F (w) is differentiable and L-smooth:
||∇F (w)−∇F (w′)|| ≤ L||w −w′||, ∀w,w′ ∈ Rd.
Assumption 5 (Limited number of Byzantine workers). The number of Byzantine workers
at each iteration is not larger than r.
Remark 2. Please note that we do not explicitly assume limited delay here, because it can
be guaranteed by the definition of loyal workers. Workers with too heavy delay would be seen
as Byzantine workers in our analysis.
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Remark 3. Please also note that we do not give any assumption about convexity. The
analysis in this section is suitable for both convex and non-convex models in machine learning,
such as logistic regression and deep neural networks.
Before formally giving theoretical results about convergence, we define a type of constant
CM,K , which will be used in our theoretical results.
Definition 4. ∀M ∈ Z, K ∈ Z, 0 < K ≤ M2 , constant CM,K is defined as:
CM,K =
{
M, K = 1;
M !(K−1)K−1(M−K)M−K
(K−1)!(M−K)!(M−1)M−1 , 1 < K ≤ M2 .
Lemma 1. If Aggr(·) is q-Byzantine Robust, and there are no more than r Byzantine
workers (r ≤ q), then:
E[||Gt||2 | wt] ≤ CB−r,q−r+1D2d.
Lemma 2. If Aggr(·) is q-Byzantine Robust, then:
||E[Gt −∇F (wt) | wt]|| ≤ CB−r,q−r+1Dd · (τmaxL
√
CB−r,q−r+1d+ 1).
Theorem 1. If Aggr(·) is q-Byzantine Robust and r ≤ q, taking learning rate η = 1
L
√
T
, we
have: ∑T−1
t=0 E[||∇F (wt)||2]
T
≤O
(
1√
T
)
+O
(
CB−r,q−r+1D2d
)
+O
(
[CB−r,q−r+1]
3
2D2d
3
2 τmaxL
)
.
We can find that BASGD has a similar theoretical convergence rate as that of vanilla
ASGD, with an extra constant variance which corresponds to the constant CB−r,q−r+1.
Lemma 3. ∀B, q, r ∈ Z+, 0 ≤ r ≤ q < B2 ,
CB−r,q−r+1 ≤
B ·
e
2pi
√
B−1√
(B−q−1)(q−r) , r < q;
B − q, r = q.
Then we have the following conclusions:
• When B and q are fixed, the upper bound of CB−r,q−r+1 will increase when r (number
of Byzantine workers) increases. Namely, the upper bound will be larger if there are
more Byzantine workers.
• When B and r are fixed, q measures the Byzantine Robust degree of aggregation
function Aggr(·). The factor 1√
(B−q−1)(q−r) is monotonically decreasing with respect
to q, when q < B−1+r2 . Since r ≤ q < B2 , the upper bound will decrease when q
increases. Also, B − q decreases when q increases. Namely, the upper bound will be
smaller if Aggr(·) has a stronger q-BR property.
• In the worst case (q = r), the upper bound of CB−r,q−r+1 is linear to B. Even in the
best case (r = 0, q = bB−12 c), the denominator is about B2 and the upper bound of
CB−r,q−r+1 is linear to
√
B. That is to say, larger buffer number B might result in
slower convergence and higher loss. Hence, unless necessary, we should choose B as
small as possible.
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5. Experiment
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of BASGD and baselines. Our
experiments are conducted on a distributed platform with dockers. Each docker is bound to
an NVIDIA Tesla V100 (32G) GPU. In all experiments, we choose 30 dockers as workers,
and one extra docker as the server. All algorithms are implemented with PyTorch 1.3.
5.1 Experimental Setting
The algorithms are evaluated on the CIFAR-10 image classification dataset (Krizhevsky et al.,
2009) with a deep learning model ResNet-20 (He et al., 2016). Each worker is manually set to
have a delay kdel which is randomly sampled from a truncated standard normal distribution
within interval [0,+∞).
We use cross-entropy loss on training set (training loss) and top-1 accuracy on test set to
quantitatively measure the performance. In an asynchronous algorithm, the epoch number
on different workers may differ. Hence, we use the average cross-entropy loss and average
top-1 accuracy on all workers w.r.t. epochs as the final metrics.
We set initial learning rate η = 0.1 for each algorithm, and multiply η by 0.1 at the
80-th epoch and the 120-th epoch respectively. The weight decay is set to 10−4. We run
each algorithm for 180 epochs, but only the results of the first 160 epochs will be taken into
account because some workers may finish earlier than others. Training set is randomly and
equally distributed to different workers, and the batch size on each worker is set to 25.
Because the focus of this paper is on ABL, SBL methods cannot be directly compared
with BASGD. The ABL method Zeno++ (Xie et al., 2019a) either cannot be directly
compared with BASGD, because Zeno++ needs to store some training instances on the
server. Hence, in our experiments, we compare BASGD with vanilla ASGD and the ABL
baseline Kardam (Damaskinos et al., 2018). For Kardam, we set the dampening function to
be Λ(τ) = 11+τ as suggested in (Damaskinos et al., 2018).
5.2 Cases without Byzantine Workers
We compare the performance of different methods when there are no Byzantine workers.
Experimental results with median and trmean aggregation functions are illustrated in
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b), respectively.
We can find that ASGD achieves the best performance. BASGD (B > 1) and Kardam
have similar convergence rate as ASGD, but both sacrifice a little accuracy. Furthermore, the
performance of BASGD gets worse when the buffer number B increases, which is consistent
with the theoretical results. Please note that ASGD is a degenerated case of BASGD
with B = 1. Hence, in the cases without attack or error, BASGD can achieve the same
performance as ASGD by setting B = 1.
5.3 Cases with Byzantine Workers
We compare the performance of different methods under two types of attack: negative
gradient attack (NG-attack) and random disturbance attack (RD-attack). In NG-attack,
Byzantine workers will send g˜NG = −katk ·g to the server, where g is the correctly computed
gradient based on its training data. In RD-attack, Byzantine workers will send g˜RD = g+grad
11
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Figure 3: Average top-1 test accuracy and training loss w.r.t. epochs when there are no
Byzantine workers. The aggregation function in BASGD is median and q-trimmed
mean. f is the hyper-parameter about the assumed number of Byzantine workers
in Kardam.
to the server, where grad is a random vector with each coordinate randomly sampled from
a normal distribution N (0, σ2atk). We set katk = 10 for NG-attack, and σ2atk = ||15g||2 for
RD-attack. NG-attack is a typical kind of malicious attack, while RD-attack can be seen as
an accidental error with expectation 0. For each type of attack, we conduct two experiments
in which there are 3 and 6 Byzantine workers, respectively. We respectively set 10 and 15
buffers for BASGD in these two experiments.
Figure 4(a) (for 3 Byzantine workers) and Figure 4(b) (for 6 Byzantine workers) illustrate
the average top-1 test accuracy w.r.t. epochs. Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) illustrate the
average training loss w.r.t. epochs. In Figure 5, some curves do not appear, because the
value of loss function is extremely large or even not a number (NaN), due to the Byzantine
attack.
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(a) Case of 3 Byzantine workers
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Figure 4: Average top-1 test accuracy w.r.t. epochs in face of random disturbance at-
tack (above) and negative gradient attack (below), when the number of Byzantine
workers r = 3 and 6. f is the hyper-parameter about the assumed number of
Byzantine workers in Kardam.
We can find that BASGD significantly outperforms ASGD and Kardam under both RD-
attack (accidental error) and NG-attack (malicious attack). Although ASGD and Kardam
can still converge under the less harmful RD-attack, they both suffer a significant loss on
accuracy. Under the NG-attack, even if we have set the number of assumed Byzantine
workers to the maximum value for Kardam (f = 14), both ASGD and Kardam cannot
converge. Hence, both ASGD and Kardam cannot resist malicious attack. On the contrary,
both types of attack have little effect on the performance of BASGD. Furthermore, in our
experiments we find that Kardam filters more than 80% of the gradients, which means that
Kardam also filters most of the correct gradients in order to filter the faulty (error) gradients.
This might explains why Kardam has a poor performance under malicious attack.
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(a) Case of 3 Byzantine workers
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Figure 5: Average training loss w.r.t. epochs in face of random disturbance attack (above)
and negative gradient attack (below), when the number of Byzantine workers
r = 3 and 6. f is the hyper-parameter about the assumed number of Byzantine
workers in Kardam. Some curves do not appear in the figure, because the value of
loss function is extremely large or even not a number (NaN).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel method called BASGD for Byzantine learning. BASGD is
asynchronous, which has more practical applications than synchronous methods. Further-
more, BASGD has no need to store any training instances on the server, which provides
a potential solution for preserving privacy in distributed learning. In addition, BASGD
is theoretically proved to have the ability of resisting against error and malicious attack.
Empirical results show that BASGD can significantly outperform vanilla ASGD and other
asynchronous Byzantine learning baselines, when there exists error or attack on workers.
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